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The Challenge of Agricultural 
Development in Africa 
Jacques Diouf 
It is certainly a great honor for me to come back, years later, 
to the family of dedicated men and women of the CGIAR, and 
to address a distinguished gathering of prominent scientists 
and administrators. Beyond the importance of issues we will 
discuss today, it is not without emotion that I take this oppor- 
tunity to pay tribute to the late Sir John Crawford. I met Sir John 
in 1972, one year after WARDA (West Africa Rice Development 
Association) was launched, to seek support for that fledging 
project. As a man of vision, he discerned immediately, beyond 
the scientific shortcomings of a nascent organization, the great 
potential of an institution that would seek to foster cooperation 
among several African states. Even more, he felt the moral 
obligation to put the weight of his influence behind securing 
the financial and scientific backing for the WARDA initiative in 
countries which the CGIAR stood to help. 
Almost 20 years later, SPAAR (Special Program for African 
Agricultural Research), responding to the depth of deteriora- 
tion in African agriculture, is also seeking to dig in the same 
field of cooperation among national agricultural research cen- 
ters, especially through networking relationships. Naturally, 
this road is not without obstacles and difficulties, but it is the 
critical path toward a rebirth of agriculture in Africa. 
Jacques Diouf, a Senegalese agronomist, is Secretary General of the 
Banque Centrale des Etats de 1’Afrique de l’Ouest, Dakar. 1 
Sir John had the serene gentleness of those born in humble 
circumstances whose peers in life elevated to the heights of 
fame. He distinguished himself not only by his scientific excel- 
lence, but more so, by the fact that he had the art of giving the 
human touch to his action which is the very essence of man- 
hood. Because he dedicated his life “to feed this world,” we 
owe him a great deal and we pray for him. 
Ladies and gentlemen, why a lecture on “the challenge of 
agricultural development in Africa”? 
l Firstly, agriculture is of vital importance to Africa. In 1987, 
62 percent of its total population and 65 percent of the 
economically active population were in the sector (FAO, 
1988). 
l Secondly, Africa is the only continent where food produc- 
tion per capita has been declining, to the point of being a 
matter of serious concern for the world community. 
l Thirdly, those who have the knowledge and the resources 
necessary for the solution of this vital problem are here or 
are represented in this audience. 
l Lastly, an African should say what he feels and thinks 
about this challenge to his continent. 
Let us therefore examine the facts regarding African agricul- 
ture, analyze the causes and consequences of its slow growth, 
and try to explore the different ways out of the present 
situation. 
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-J Evolution of African Agriculture t- 
Declining agriculture and increasing population 
Between 1965 and 1973, agricultural production in Africa 
was growing at an annual average rate of 2.4 percent, with 
population increasing at 2.6 percent. Between 1973 and 1980, 
the annual rate of agricultural production fell drastically to 0.3 
percent, while the population rate increased to 2.8 percent. 
Then between 1980 and 1987, though improvement could be 
observed, production performance was half that of the first 
period, while population further increased to an annual rate of 
3.1 percent. 
According to World Bank indicators for Africa and other 
parts of the world, nowhere else has the situation evolved so 
negatively (World Bank, 1989). This assessment is also con- 
firmed by FAO statistics, which show that only the African 
index of agricultural production per capita has been negative 
between 1965 and 1986 (FAO, 1987). 
What are the consequences? 
l The first is that Africa is not able to feed its population. 
The stark reality of this fact-in images of starving children 
-has penetrated by television into the day-to-day quiet of 
affluent societies, giving an ethical dimension to this prob- 
lem and raising questions for our consciences. Why did 
human science, if not human wisdom, not help to prevent 
death, illness and poverty for so many of our fellow men 
and women? At this very moment, we know that the spec- 
ter of starvation hangs over millions of Africans in the 
eastern and southern parts of the continent. 
l The second is that Africa’s economic situation has sharply 
deteriorated because agriculture represents 33 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan countries, 
and for some countries up to 76 percent of GDP Between 
1974 and 1987, cereal imports doubled to more than US$l 
billion, despite the infusion of food aid which tripled dur- 
ing the same period (World Bank, 1989). Agricultural 
exports which constituted the strength of dynamic African 3 
economies, instead of increasing, decreased by 15 percent 
between 1980 and 1986 (FAO, 1987). After a successful 
take-off, many of these countries may well have to make a 
forced landing, back to the lower-income category, to the 
dismay of Rostow supporters. 
Reasons for agricultural decline 
Now, why is the agricultural picture of Africa so gloomy? Let 
us first mention some arguments which certainly have merits, 
but which do not seem to constitute the most important reasons 
for the present situation: Climatic adversities are found, to a 
certain degree, in other continents which experience droughts, 
typhoons and hurricanes; civil unrest and war are unfor- 
tunately not a monopoly of any given region of the developing 
world; access to markets is no less difficult for African agri- 
cultural products than for those from other Third World 
origins; and unstable world prices are the same for all coun- 
tries, though some may have a greater capacity to counter the 
effects of subsidies. I do not mean to say that these factors do 
not adversely affect agricultural production in Africa in a 
serious way They do, and in particular international prices of 
primary commodities. Some African exporters of agricultural 
products lost up to one third of their export earnings, due to 
the sharp decline in world prices. And, the duration of drought 
in the Sahel during the 1970s and 1980s was longer than any- 
where else outside Africa. No economy, even a developed one, 
can sustain such circumstances for a long period without hav- 
ing its social balance, which is the foundation of economic 
growth, profoundly disrupted. 
Action must therefore be taken in the appropriate fora to 
correct those factors which are within our reach. Food aid 
should be provided at critical times through the World Food 
Program or bilateral arrangements. Terms of trade and protec- 
tionism have to be addressed in the Uruguay round of GATT, in 
UNCTAD and in international commodity organizations. Polit- 
ical issues leading to internal and external confrontation, with 
destruction and forced migration of populations, need to be 
settled peacefully, either bilaterally or in the framework of the 
4 OAU and the United Nations. 
But I wish to stress the fact that one must develop first the 
capacity to produce efficiently, to be able to stand up to a diffi- 
cult internal environment and harsh international competition. 
Under equivalent conditions, some regions managed to sub- 
stantially increase their agricultural output and Africa did not. 
Why? I will submit that Africa has not benefitted from the new 
agricultural technology and many countries did not adopt con- 
ducive policies that would have allowed themselves to benefit. 
d The Technology of African Agriculture t- 
THE PROBLEMS 
Comparatively low yields for the continent 
A survey of the main agricultural commodities shows that 
generally yields in Africa are extremely low, but have increased 
notably in other continents. Between 1961/65 and 1987, glob- 
ally, yields of sorghum and millet increased by 46 percent and 
26 percent, respectively; for Africa, they remained almost stag- 
nant. During the same period, yields of wheat, maize and rice 
increased by 93 percent, 65 percent, and 58 percent; in 1987 in 
Africa, yields of all three commodities were much lower than 
those obtained in the world in 1961165. (FAO, 1988.) 
We know that average yields, which convey the gross pro- 
ductivity of land, should be used with caution, as only one 
factor to be taken into consideration and that their significance 
depends largely on the quality of soil. Other factors could affect 
interpretation of the results-such as the time necessary for 
production or the technology used, particularly the supply of 
water and the inputs applied. Nonetheless, yields are the best 
available indicator for measuring the productivity of agricul- 
ture at the global level. 
Inadequate focus on Africa’s major crops 
Why did Africa not take advantage of the research break- 
throughs in high-yielding varieties developed in the interna- 
tional agricultural research centers? The adoption of those 
varieties, in Asia particularly, fundamentally reversed the trend 5 
of agricultural production, turning a near-famine situation into 
one of surplus, positively affecting the lives of a billion people. 
Why does Africa have only 7 percent of its area sown with 
high-yielding varieties compared to 17 percent in the Near 
East, 30 percent in Latin America, and up to 72 percent in Asia, 
allowing these continents to increase their production at rates 
of up to 4 percent annually (FAO, 1988)? I will suggest two 
explanations: 
l Firstly, the tremendous financial and scientific resources 
which the CGIAR succeeded in mobilizing have concen- 
trated on commodities with marginal interest in Africa. 
. Secondly, most national agricultural research programs in 
Africa do not have the capacity to absorb research results 
that could be useful to their circumstances. 
The major crops in Africa are: in the Sahelian zone, millet 
and sorghum which represent 40 percent and 18 percent of 
world production, and in the tropical zone, yam, plantain and 
cassava whichrepresent 95 percent, 70 percent, and 44 percent 
of world production. Neither rice nor wheat, which spear- 
headed the Green Revolution, are of importance to Africa. The 
continent’s output for each is only 2 percent of world produc- 
tion. Besides, the available rice technology was mainly devel- 
oped for irrigated land which does not suit African conditions 
where upland, deep-flooded and mangrove swamp rice are 
prevalent. It could be added that nearly all research was made 
on oryza sativa, instead of oryza glaberrima which used to be 
traditionally cultivated in Africa. 
Now, let us look at two of the international agricultural 
research centers having specific responsibility in Africa. IITA 
(International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Ibadan, 
Nigeria], in contrast with crop-oriented international centers, 
has to improve systems of agricultural production in the humid 
tropics. This broad mandate over a vast area and the delays in 
its operations, due to local constraints, did not allow it to have 
an impact similar to those of 1RR.l (International Rice Research 
Institute) and CIMMYT (Centro International de Mejoriamento 
de Maize y Trigo) on rice and wheat, respectively. ICRISAT 
6 (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics), though covering an important area of sub-Saharan 
Africa, is located in India. The results in Africa of this impor- 
tant international program cannot match those of a crop- 
oriented institution in its region of establishment. In short, as 
Warren Baum, former chairman of the CGIAR, put it: “The 
green revolution bypassed Africa.” (Baum and Lejeune, 2986) 
What we said regarding the productivity of crops important 
for feeding Africa is valid for those which bring export earn- 
ings. Between 1961/65 and 1987, cocoa yields in Africa 
increased by 10 percent, whereas in Latin America yields 
almost doubled and in Asia more than tripled. African yields 
today are at the level where those two regions were 20 years 
ago. In Africa, groundnut yields have been stagnant over the 
past 20 years, while yields for other oilseeds have increased: 
soybean by 65 percent and sunflower by 39 percent. Thus, the 
African capacity to compete on the world market is seriously 
jeopardized. 
Most limiting factors not yet addressed 
Why is productivity so low in Africa? It is because research 
was not able to solve the most limiting factors to increased 
production. The soils of the Sahelian and sub-humid zones are 
sandy (20 percent), poor in nutrients, and subject to intense 
erosion. The soils of the lowland tropics (18 percent) are acidic, 
with low absorptive capacity, and also poor in nutrients. Other 
soils are in desert areas (22 percent) or are difficult to use. The 
high temperatures and the intense luminosity in sub-Saharan 
Africa are favorable to photosynthesis and plant growth. The 
rainfall is generally adequate; 54 percent of the continent 
receives annual rainfall between 900 mm and 1,750 mm. How- 
ever, the occurrence risk for drought is high for 66 percent of 
the area. 
An FAO study shows that in Africa it is impossible to have 
direct rainfed production on 46 percent of the land, 8 percent 
suffers from high variations in humidity, 16 percent has excess 
humidity, and only 30 percent is adapted to rainfed production 
(FAO, 1986). 7 
Seeds are performing poorly because very few improved 
high-yielding varieties are used in farmers’ fields, leaving the 
great potential of plant breeding untapped. Concrete results 
may be expected in the not too distant future for rice, millet, 
sorghum and maize, because these crops have a natural way of I: 
reproducing through self- or cross-pollination. For African 
roots and tubers which reproduce vegetatively new techniques 
will be required, not only from CGIAR-type centers but from s 
research institutes in developed countries, for basic and funda- 
mental research on such crops. 
If breeding can integrate production targets, disease resis- 
tance, and foqd quality requirements, the use of fertilizers and 
pesticides allows the plant to show all its potential. In many 
agricultural production systems in Africa, nutrients are recon- 
stituted through shifting cultivation. Using the land more 
effectively will require both chemical and organic fertilizers, 
especially phosphate which is low in African soils and often 
fixed by acid soils in non-assimilable form. Nitrogen which 
needs careful packaging and is costly could be partially sup- 
plied through rotating production involving leguminous 
plants. Potasssium is sometimes necessary, and calcium is use- 
ful in acid soils. Many African soils also need copper, zinc and 
molybdenum. 
Insect pests are important constraints in Africa, as they may 
be responsible for losses of up to 35 -percent of the potential 
crop (FAO, 1986b). As for pesticides and herbicides, their use 
should be economically justified, due to their cost and possible 
negative effects on the environment. Adequate responses to 
many plant diseases, particularly in the African humid tropics, 
should be provided through genetic screening and breeding for 
resistance. 
National research beset with problems 
What are the main problems of research systems in Africa? 
National agricultural systems in Africa have serious financial 
problems. Surprisingly, it is not the amount spent which is the 
main problem. The annual investment in research by national 
6 
systems of sub-Saharan Africa was around US$395 million in 
1982 (ISNAR, 1988). Between 1959 and 1980, the budget for 
? 
agricultural research by African countries increased 268 per- 
cent. During the same period, it increased by 481 percent in 
Latin America and by 588 percent in Asia. Cereal research 
expenditure per hectare in Africa is 20 percent lower than for 
that in Latin America, and 66 percent lower compared to Asia. 
The allocation is particularly inadequate; most resources are 
spent for personnel, leaving out equipment and operational 
costs. This situation worsened in the 198Os, with a large 
increase in expenditure on research staff as part of the total 
budget. Also, the timing of allocation is not regular, creating 
cash flow problems, often at a crucial period in the evolution of 
a biological process and causing irreversible damage. Fluctua- 
tion in the annual amount of funds available creates uncer- 
tainty and difficulty in planning. As a consequence, 
infrastructure, offices, laboratories and field experiments are 
usually not properly maintained. The equipment is often obso- 
lete and unreliable. 
National agricultural research in Africa also has serious 
problems with human resources. Here also, it is not the 
number of researchers which is the most limiting factor. Some 
5,500 scientists were employed in national systems in 1982 
(FAO, 1986b). The man-years of research staff per hectare are 
only 17 percent lower than Latin America and less than half 
the figure for Asia. The distribution between scientific and 
supporting staff, both technical and administrative, is often 
inadequate. On the scientific team, there is no proper mix 
among breeders, soil scientists, pathologists; entomologists, and 
engineers. Also in most national research centers, the number 
of economists and sociologists is deficient. Managerial staff has 
been seriously lacking in three ways: in the planning and con- 
duct of research projects, the use and accounting of financial 
resources, and the administration and motivation of personnel. 
Training and management are critical 
Training remains at the center of any initiative to reinforce 
national agricultural research systems in Africa. But it must be 
realized that training needs have evolved over the years. There 
is a corps of Africans with graduate degrees (who sometimes 
are unemployed) which did not exist in the 1960s and early 9 
1970s. Nowadays, what is most required for research staff is 
post-graduate training. Fellowship in the international agri- 
cultural research centers and the research centers of developed 
countries is also needed to acquire experience with team work 
and to establish the personal linkages for future collaborative 
work. To this effect, exchange of research staff should be 
organized particularly during sabbatical years. The training of 
supporting technical staff could be undertaken with those 
Africans who have participated in appropriate programs of the 
international agricultural research centers. Sp,ecial training 
programs for managerial staff, not only of research projects but 
mainly of the financial and administrative aspects of research 
programs, should be-initiated on a large scale. This is a neces- 
sary condition for effective use of the important resources to be 




Link missing between universities and research 
institutes 
Universities are another important source of untapped 
potential for research expertise which has not been adequately 
mobilized in Africa. The current isolation of different depart- 
ments (especially in the absence of special training for agri- 
cultural graduates outside the university) prevents the 
necessary interaction which was so successful in the land- 
grant university experience of the United States. Therefore, the 
skills and resources of high-level teachers, teaching assistants, 
laboratories and documentation centers that are available in the 
places of higher learning are ignored by agricultural research, 
which so desperately needs such scarce resources. For this 
reason, there should be a mechanism of interface between uni- 
versities and research centers in English-speaking countries, 
and among universities, high-level schools of agriculture and 
research centers in French-speaking countries. The effective 
operation of these two and three-part systems is one of the most 
important conditions for the enhancement of agricultural 
10 research in Africa. 
THE SOLUTIONS 
CGIAR-style support for research 
When I tried to get WARDA into the CGIAR system, after 
many ups and downs, only the network of coordinated nursery 
trials was considered worthy of support, because it could serve 
as a link between the w$rk of international and national agri- 
cultural research centers. The rice research projects on upland 
in Bouake, dee.p-flooded in Mopti, mangrove in Rokupr and 
irrigated in Richard Toll were excluded because they were sup- 
posed to be duplicating work already going on. Today, it is 
surprising to read that “WARDA had continued its activities of 
testing technologies imported from Asia rather than generating 
new technologies with its own applied research.” (Baum and 
Lejeune, 1986) Yet, it could not have been otherwise because, if 
we put aside some serious mismanagement of the institution, 
.the centers that over the years could have generated the tech- 
nology suited to African conditions did not have the proper 
support. 
I can, however, say that the CGIAR, in those days, was far 
ahead of most institutions because of its concern for supporting 
agricultural research in Africa, and it was its assistance which 
allowed WARDA to survive. A cautious attitude could be 
expected from those who had the responsibility of putting an 
emerging CGIAR on a firm basis which since then has been the 
success story of world agricultural research. But I should men- 
tion that I visited many bilateral and international organiza- 
tions for support and from many of them I got these startling 
responses: “We support development, not research,” or “We 
support a small applied research component in our projects.” 
Since then, fortunately thinking has evolved in the right direc- 
tion and their difficulties in executing successful development 
projects-without first mastering the technology required- 
has led most organizations to accept the principle of supporting 
research. 
Good will, commitment and direct involvement 
Can the goodwill and strong commitment of most national, 
regional and international organizations to help Africa over- 11 
come its problems be turned into an operational concept? What 
can the now-mature CGIAR and willing multilateral and bilat- 
eral donors do to face up to the challenge of African agri- 
cultural production? Those are the questions. 
About 40 percent of CGIAR funds are used in Africa, and 
hundreds of its scientists have their main research focus, or a 
significant part, on problems of African agriculture (1988/89 
CGIAR Annual Report). The creation of SPAAR is another step 
in the right direction, as it signals the recognition of the speci- 
ficity of the African problem, the difficulty of the present sys- 
tem to respond to African. needs, and the necessity to organize 
concerted and coordinated action. 
The CGIAR strategy seems to have been, so far, to approach 
national research problems from the periphery It has tried to 
use international centers as vectors, and even created ISNAR to 
boost this action, but it has carefully avoided direct action in 
the national research centers. It is hoped that the CGIAR will 
now consider a new policy-with some form of involvement in 
the funding, operation and evaluation of national research cen- 
ters in Africa. A venture in African research will be successful 
only if it draws upon the lessons from experience of the CGIAR 
system and adapts them to the realities of the present 
environment. 
SPAAR-devising new approaches 
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SPAAR should mobilize the full financial and scientific 
capacity of the CGIAR and its members. To this effect, it should 
devise a way for developing a step-by-step pragmatic plan of 
action which would require a commitment, on a voluntary 
basis, of appropriate resources. It should be implemented by an 
integrated system involving the international centers for agri- 
cultural research, selected research institutions of developed 
countries, regional research organizations, networks, and 
national agricultural research centers. Owing to the large 
number of institutions to be involved and the difficulty of 
operating this huge and complex machinery efficiently, 
priority-setting will be a key factor for success. It might also be 
necessary to structure the program along regional and sub- 
regional groupings, based on geographical and ecological con- , 
siderations. The research review of the World Bank has already 
started to do so, by dividing sub-Saharan Africa into two parts, 
the west on one side, and east and south on the other. 
An independent mechanism set up by SPAAR and the 
CGIAR, and relying on TAC, should evaluate, monitor and 
review the scientific value and operation of the selected pro- 
jects. A similar structure should be established for the finan- 
cial management of projects with annual external auditing. 
Such a system would replace the often conflicting and duplica- 
tive mechanism of bilateral and multilateral organizations. 
Research lresults and their effective use in the production pro- 
cess should be reported annually to SPAAR and the CGIAR. 
National agricultural research centers should be involved in 
the planning of research projects that are to be conducted with 
their participation at regional and national levels. The possi- 
bility of bearing the cost or topping-off the salaries of African 
staff involved in the projects is also required. On the other 
hand, African counterpart financial contributions as a condi- 
tion for operation should not be required. The facilities of the 
CGIAR and other centers for agricultural research should be 
used to train scientists and managerial staff, as well as techni- 
cal and administrative support staff. 
Expediting the research process 
The time dimension of this venture has to be reckoned with, 
if one considers that 6-14 years are necessary to develop a vari- 
ety and 3-6 years for testing and release. This system will have 
to invent new ways to force the pace of development in research 
for rainfed agriculture, as Africa’s irrigated land is only 4 per- 
cent of the world total. The optimum trade-off will have to be 
found between the length of time that is indispensable to yield 
research of scientific value and the necessary shortening of the 
time lag before applied research effectively has impact on pro- 
duction. Several ways to this effect could be explored: 
l The analytical work done by IBPGR (International Board 
for Plant Genetic Resources) and the germplasm existing in 
the CGIAR, other centers, and developed countries should 
lessen the time for collection and characterization. 13 
l The use of new “techniques” of gene transfer and recom- 
bination should shorten the duration of traditional tech- 
niques of hybridization and cross-pollination. 
l It will be difficult to have an affect on the time necessary 
for screening or segregating lines, selecting elite lines, and 
testing yields. A wide geographical distribution of trials 
may, however, allow identification in one season of stresses 
which otherwise would not exist or need several years to 
appear in one location. 
l With plant regeneration and cell and tissue culture, it 
should be possible to overcome problems for vegetatively 
propagated crops and phytosanitary limitations to their 
international testing. 
Better use of available technology 
But more than these necessary long-term solutions, there is 
already an immense stock of improved ‘plants available at the 
international level which could be obtained through exchange 
programs. Even in the national agricultural research centers, 
there is a body of useful knowledge and material which has not 
found its way through to the farmer and which, properly pack- 
aged and used, could dramatically change the rate of produc- 
tion in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Linking research efforts to on-farm constraints 
This situation brings us to the problem of interface between 
research and development which constitutes one of the main 
weaknesses of African agricultural research. Very often, devel- 
opment partners are not involved in the identification of pro- 
duction constraints and farmers’ real-life technical and 
socioeconomic conditions. Consequently, the conception of 
research projects and field tests is a solo exercise by 
researchers. No wonder, therefore, that there is sometimes “a 
black hole” between what is imagined on research stations and 
what is happening on the farm. Priority should therefore be 
given to setting up a mechanism of proper interface between 
research and development and identification of results which 
14 could have an immediate impact on production. But knowl- 
edge itself is not enough to increase production. It is a way for 
farmers, if trained efficiently, to maximize their results through 
a combination of physical resources-seed, fertilizers and 
pesticides-in an environment involving soil, water and solar 
energy It is development policy which has to ensure the opti- 
mal mix of these factors at the farmers’ level and to create 
conditions for the output to be financially profitable and 
thereby constitute an incentive for investment in the agri- 
cultural sector. 
-! Agricultural Policies in Africa t- 
THE THEORY 
The ideological debates on agricultural development which 
prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s are toning down in the 
face of today’s realities. in the world market for commodities 
and financial resources. They, nevertheless, had a great influ- 
ence on agricultural policies which are still prevalent in Africa. 
The issues, among others, that should be mentioned are: prior- 
ity to the industrial sector, the question of ownership of the 
means of production, the problem of optimum farm size and 
the principle of price stabilization. 
The advocates of priority to the industrial sector, sometimes 
heavy industries, found their rationale in the arguments of two 
economists: Friedrich List who in his growth stage theory 
regarded domestic industrial development as the most impor- 
tant generator of agricultural progress. J. H. Boeke who, in his 
static dual-economy model, underlined differences between 
social needs of traditional societies and the economic need of 
western societies, and concluded that it is futile to try to intro- 
duce western technology and institutions to modernize tradi- 
tional agriculture. (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). 
John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, however, in their dynamic 
dual model, recognized that “an underdeveloped economy 
which attempts to force the pace of industrialization while 
disregarding the need for a priori or at least simultaneous revo- 
lution in its agricultural sector will find the going most diffi- 
cult.” But it is W W Rostow who, despite the shortcomings of 15 
his leading sector theory, had the merit of emphasizing “the 
critical importance of rapid growth in agricultural output dur- 
ing the early stages of economic development.” (Hayami and 
Ruttan, 1985). 
Today, planners are discovering what John Stuart Mill said 
so evidently: “When following an improvement in the cultiva- 
tion of the soils, half of the active population is sufficient to 
produce food necessary for the whole society, the other half 
may try to satisfy the other needs of humanity or their fantasy.” 
And it is recognized that “industrialization and agricultural 
development are not valid alternatives. Raising agricultural 
productivity and inducing a marketed surplus of farm prod- 
ucts must be a major concern, as must development of linkages 
between the two sectors that will give effect to the interdepen- 
dence required between them in a modern industrial econ- 
omy,” (Southwork and Johnston, 1967). This realization of the 
importance of agriculture in economic development of Africa is 
translated as a principle in the Lagos Plan of Action of April 
1980 and quantified in terms of investment by the United 
Nations’ Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development, 1986-1990. 
The debate on the question of ownership of land and factors 
of production was triggered by the Marxists who mandated 
collective appropriation and farming of the land: the means of 
production being, in the first stage, under the control of a coop- 
erative, the kolkhoz, supported by a station of agricultural 
machinery and traktors; in the second stage, under the respon- 
sibility of a state enterprise, the sovkhoz (Academy of Science, 
USSR). This basic scheme was implemented in most socialist 
countries with varying degrees of adaptation. The attempts to 
implement it in sub-Saharan Africa generally did not go beyond 
state ownership of land and creation of some usually unsuc- 
cessful state farms. 
More recently, the European Economic Community triggered 
another debate that concerns farm size. Impressed by the effi- 
ciency of large American agricultural enterprises, as Marx was 
with English farms, it recommended large production units, a 
kind of cooperatives and farms with integrated land use, allow- 
16 ing for more effective combination of labor, land and capital 
(EEC, Mansholt Plan, 1964). However, the application of the 
theory of economies of scale to the farm quickly reaches the 
limits imposed by the law of diminishing returns in an activity 
which is essentially biological. 
The intervention of the state in regulating prices is consid- 
ered as a self-evident necessity, which both French- and 
English-speaking African countries inherited from the colonial 
era in some form of organization of markets for agricultural 
commodities. It was accepted that “economic history teaches 
that state interventions, more or less vigorous, are necessary to 
correct the imbalances of the law of supply and demand on the 
agricultural markets. Overtime, food markets have always been 
regulated and controlled.” (Milhau and Montagne, 1964) It is 
not surprising, therefore, that marketing boards and stabiliza- 
tion funds ,flourished throughout the continent. The domi- 
nance today of the theory of minimum state intervention, 
supported particularly by Milton Friedman and William E. 
Simon, should not make us lose sight of the historical perspec- 
tive of this problem. 
Beyond theory, which elevates the discussion on African 
agriculture, we should draw upon the lessons of experience 
which indicate that accelerated agricultural development is 
possible. 
THE PRACTICE 
Market interventions and distortions 
Most African governments have intervened in price-fixing, 
either by providing subsidies or collecting taxes. These direct 
actions in agriculture have distorted the market at a cost in 
different countries. Under a no-intervention policy, the level of 
internal price equilibrium depends on world market prices at 
the border, the exchange rate and domestic marketing margins. 
The first problem is that the border price is distorted by sub- 
sidies in the countries of origin either directly or by manipula- 
tion of the nominal exchange rate. In 1984, developed countries 
spent more than US$30 billion to subsidize agriculture. The 
second problem is that world market prices vary widely due to 
climatic changes, the low short-term elasticity of supply and 17 
demand in relation to prices, and the seasonality of most crops. 
The price instability indices for some commodities may vary 
up or down the trend value by lo-91 percent. Under such cir- 
cumstances, many African countries, with a view to lessen the 
effect of these variations, had to develop mechanisms for stabi- 
lizing prices and systems of equalization when several com- 
modities were concerned. 
If it is difficult to object to the principle, the end results of 
the implementation, and in particular the cost incurred, made 
the system unsustainable. The beneficiaries have been mainly 
urban populations, because well-organized trade unions in 
cities have constituted a forceful pressure group capable of 
obtaining lower prices for consumer goods which are included 
in the indicators used for evaluating the purchasing power of 
workers. Farmers who tend to consume local products, often 
available on the farm, are unable to take the same advantage of 
national resources so diverted. This in itself could be accept- 
able, as these subsidized products enter, in large part, into the 
diet of the urban or suburban poor who cannot afford supple- 
ments of fish, meat and vegetables. But problems arise when 
subsidized products are diverted to neighboring countries to be 
supplied at a lower cost than the world market, when they are 
used in animal feed, or when they discourage local production 
of substitutes. All these deviations were observed in Africa. 
Therefore, adjustment programs have strongly focussed on cut- 
ting these subsidies, particularly when funds set up to this 
effect were in the red, as was often the case. 
I would argue that a “laissez-faire” policy, despite its 
declared advantage on long-term adaptation, is not a feasible 
solution. Not only could it bring about food riots, as was 
observed in some countries, but a stabilization system can ope- 
rate efficiently if the level of subsidy is not too high and if it is 
flexible enough to allow correction based on past trends. 
The same objective was pursued in Africa with the fixing of 
farmgate prices. It is, however, a much more perilous exercise, 
because the proper relation has to be established with border 
prices and the profitability to farmers which depends on the 
cost of production. This is why many governments have devel- 
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oped subsidy schemes for seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and 
in some cases, extending them to agricultural equipment. The 
objective is not only to maximize farmers’ revenue, but to 
encourage the use of modern techniques for increase’d output. 
Mistaking institutions for policy 
Here again, perverse effects were observed with transna- 
tional transfers and over-utilization beyond optimum needs. 
The schemes are now being scrapped with the advent of new 
policies, but one cannot help being puzzled by the early conse- 
quences: farmers are not using new’improved varieties but . 
retaining their seeds to a point of degeneration, fertilizer and 
pesticide consumption is going down, and some farmers are 
stopping production. Even if we take into consideration the 
latency period before the operation of market forces and the 
corrective factors of diverted uses, all things being equal, there 
can be no productivity gains without increased use of inputs. 
It seems that very often the policy has been mistaken for the 
institutions implementing them, mostly marketing boards and 
stabilization funds which were in general badly mismanaged at 
both the financial and operational levels. 
Sectoral bias 
In the early stages of agricultural modernization and growth, 
reasonable incentives toward these factors of production is 
most useful. But agricultural policies should not be analyzed 
in isolation from other sectors, because they are an integral part 
of economic policy. Decisions taken in the industrial or the 
services sector interact with actions in the agricultural sector. 
Labor, goods and capital flow from one sector to the other on 
the basis of comparative advantage which could be distorted by 
taxation, subsidies or trade restrictions. 
But Africa is far from being the part of the world where the 
bias of industrial protection against agriculture is the highest. 
On the contrary, on the relations between the agricultural and 
financial sectors in Africa, there is much to say. Agriculture, 
being an important source of revenue for the budget, incurred 
huge outward transfers of funds through direct taxation on 
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marketing margins. New policies have tended to correct this 
situation, often by moving from one extreme to the other. Yet 
without comparative alternative sources of revenues being gen- 
erated, countries are now having difficulties in balancing their 
budgets. 
Breakdowns in agricultural credit 
The other serious problem has been the breakdown of many 
state-owned credit institutions specializing in agriculture. 
Loans were given without adequate collateral; farmers’ debts 
were forgiven during climatic crisis without adequate provision 
to compensate for them; low preferential interest rates were 
fixed without consideration to the cost of resources; and 
financing of seasonal credit was made at farmgates prices that 
were higher than equivalent border prices, creating losses not 
always reimbursed by stabilization funds. 
Restructuring of the banking system should give birth to 
new and efficient credit institutions with much less influence 
by the state in management. New operating rules guided by 
market interest rates and with a proper independent control 
should encourage local savings and attract external lines of 
credit. But it is impossible to develop the agricultural sector 
with short- and medium-term loans when interest rates exceed 
16 percent, for example; projects will be unable under such 
conditions to generate adequate internal rates of return. It is, 
therefore, indispensable to have “interest rebate funds” despite 
their distorting effect in relation to sectors not benefitting from 
them. 
The relation between agriculture and currency is much more 
complex. A lot has been said about the over-valuation of the real 
exchange rate defined as the ratio of the prices of traded goods 
to the prices of non-traded goods. Statistical evaluation does 
not show a correlation between devaluation and economic 
growth. If it is true that currency manipulation is an efficient 
tool in adjustment programs, the structure of the economies in 
Africa and the implications of monetary unions would com- 
mand careful scrutiny of alternative solutions. Very often it 
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might be more feasible to act on prices and interest rates. 
Above all, it should be stressed that agriculture suffers the 
repercussions of adjustment programs in Africa. The restrictive 
measures on spending have an impact on investment. The clos- 
ing down and streamlining of private companies or parastatals 
increase unemployment and negatively affect the demand for 
agricultural products. 
-I A Long-term Scenario for Recovery t- 
An overturn of the economy and of agricultural productivity 
cannot be achieved in the short term. There will be a long 
transition period toward recovery and growth. During that 
period, Africa will need the long-term commitment of 
resources and technical support on the basis of agreed policies 
periodically monitored and realigned. The flow of resources 
will have to be massive and sustained over a 10-20 year period. 
Solutions should be found that avoid over-using and stretch- 
ing the scarce human resources of African countries. The prep- 
aration and evaluation of projects and programs are too 
demanding on African staff time and projects and programs 
often have to be renegotiated on a bilateral basis, after agree- 
ment in multilateral meetings such as consultative groups or 
Paris and London Club meetings. 
In this presentation, sub-Saharan African has been 
described as one unit with average indicators. However, more 
refined analytical tools would have shown deviations from the 
apparent uniformity. Most countries are at different levels of the 
low-income category, and nearly all the remaining countries 
are in the middle-income category. Climatic conditions and 
soils vary widely over a large area stretching from the northern 
to the southern hemispheres. The policies induced by history, 
ideology and personality have resulted in varying degrees of 
success in agricultural production and productivity. But what 
has been said remains generally true even if averages shadow 
excellence and water down failures. 
Africa is trying to rebuild its agriculture under very difficult 
conditions. Governments are struggling to pay monthly salaries 
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of civil servants under the pressure of trade unions defending 
the interests of their members. They are on a tightrope to pay 
the debt service of bilateral and multilateral creditors under the 
threat of further assistance being suspended. They have, 
despite the dramatic consequence of falling world prices on 
their financial capacity, to meet their obligations with house- 
holds, firms and the local banking system. They are obliged to 
balance their budgets, though their capacity to collect revenues 
from duties and taxes is hampered by reduced economic activ- 
ity. For governments, crisis management leaves little scope for 
investment in the future, however essential. 
Today, Africa needs a hand of solidarity to address its pov- 
erty and to develop its own potential for feeding a population 
which will almost triple by the year 2025. Let us collectively 
make sure that Africa, the continent which saw the emergence 
of man, does not in the next century, for lack of food, become a 
desert of starvation. 
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